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state discretion - the case has dearly hobbled state efforts to es-
tablish AFDC contribution standards consistent with the state-de-
termined limits of their own monetary resources. Because the court
overlooked the distinguishing factors of the King decision, the
federal standard of need-oriented disbursements was lamentably be-
clouded, and to the extent that Solman saddled old inequities in
welfare administration with a new paradox, it may represent a
clarion for legislative reform.
CRAY J. COPPINS, JR.
DAMAGES - MEASURE OF DAMAGES - IMPAIRMENT OF
EARNING CAPACITY
Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
In present-day America, the clogged highways and airways, pol-
luted waters and skies, and heavy reliance on consumer goods have
increased the likelihood that the average citizen will someday be
seeking a damage award or settlement. Growing congestion in
the trial courts, caused largely by the bulk of -auto accident disputes,
evinces the frequency with which the damage award system is called
into play. Therefore, while today's damage award system may be
the last concern of the average citizen, tomorrow it may determine
the value of his lost eyesight, the amount of income he might have
earned in the remaining years of his life, or the dollar value of that
life itself. While he might have correctly assumed that the courts
would try to fully compensate him for his loss,' he will be surprised
to learn that the method employed to compute his award of future
damages is divorced from the realities which determine his future
loss.
1 The damage award should be "equivalent to compensation for the deprivation of
the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits that would have resulted" from the con-
tinued worklife of the claimant. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489
(1916). See also Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1913). In
Gressman v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 197 N.Y. 474, 480, 90 N.E. 1131, 1133 (1910),
the court presented the ideal that damages should be "precisely commensurate with the
injury." The future damages award should provide the plaintiff with "that sum of
money which, if invested in reasonably safe investments, will return the amount of the
decrease in plaintiff's earning capacity ... during the period of his work life .... " Law-
less, Computation of Future Damages: A View from the Bench, 54 GEO. L.J. 1131, 1134
(1966).
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
In cases where an individual has sustained permanent, debilitat-
ing injuries, the most significant component" of the damage award is
the sum which represents the compensation for his diminished fu-
ture earning capacity. To the several factors normally considered in
determining the appropriate compensation for future earnings loss,2
the court in Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.3 was invited to add
an allowance for inflation, a factor which would serve, in part, to
equate damage awards and actual losses. In Sleeman, the district
court, sitting without a jury, held that the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff, who had been struck by a privately owned vehicle while
crossing the defendant's parking lot, were partially attributable to the
railroad's failure to properly illuminate and mark the lot for pedes-
trian traffic.4 In computing the appropriate sum to compensate the
plaintiff for his total disability, the trial court reasoned that the
declining value of the dollar should cancel the customary discount
to present worth. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the lower court's assessment of damages, remanding for a
recomputation of the award with the required discount, but without
the offsetting adjustment for inflation. The court held that the
future impact of current inflation was too speculative' to be consid-
ered in the computation of future pecuniary loss.
In evaluating the reasoning set forth by the court of appeals, it
is helpful to look at the eclectic historical development of the con-
temporary formula for determining future damage awards. The
earliest Anglo-Saxon damage awards made no allowance for the
suffering and loss actually incurred by an individual plaintiff.
Rather, as judicial redress emerged in place of "vengeance of the
blood" feuds, the state established a system of money compensation,
with a schedule of fixed values for particular injuries. For example,
2 Among the factors currently considered by most federal courts in computing future
wage loss damages are wages at the accident date, worklife expectancy, the value of money
in hand (discounted to present worth), the impact of federal income tax on the lost
wages, the portion of the earned wages which would have been allotted to expenses of
the decedent (in wrongful death damages), and, in some instances, compensation from
collateral sources. See Commissioners' Awards and Opinions, at 21-22, Petition of
United States Steel Corp., Civil No. A-65-6 (N.D. Ohio May 7), appeal docketed, Civil
No. 19835-39 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 1969).
a 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
4 290 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
5 The district judge relied on the testimony of Professor Henderson of Michigan
State University, an expert witness in Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733 (W.D.
Mich. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969). Professor Hen-
derson had asserted that the declining value of the dollar would offset the discount to
present worth in an award for future pecuniary damages. Gowdy was subsequently
reversed on a conflict of laws issue, with no review of the damage award.
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the loss of an ear was worth 12 shillings and an exposed bone
brought 3 shillings." This publication of fixed damage values
by the state served to delay the emergence of a flexible process of
award determination. 7 Amid the simple society which existed fol-
lowing the Norman Conquest, the need for a flexible evaluation of
damages was recognized. It is believed that the actual assessment of
damages was introduced in England at about the same time that trial
by jury emerged - perhaps A.D. 1200.8 In the first damage
awards given in King's Court, the jury was given complete discre-
tion to assess damages based on its view of the loss in each case.
Rules of law governing the assessment of damages emerged, how-
ever, as courts sought to exert widening control over the jurors'
judgment. Justified by the belief that a jury composed of laymen
could not realistically consider the many variables which affect a
plaintiff's loss,10 this judicial tendency to delimit the role of the jury
in assessing damages has continued down to the present.
6 C. MCCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 22 (1935).
7 ld. at 23.
8 Id. at 23-24.
9 The earliest juries consisted of yeomen from the locality where the wrongful act
occurred, individuals with a personal knowledge of the particular loss or injury. The
trial judge, usually sent out from London and unfamiliar with the particular case, would
seldom correct or overturn the findings of these neighbors. With such discretion in the
jury's hands, there was little need for a law of damages. However, even in these earliest
trials of the 13th and 14th centuries, the judge would make the entire damage determina-
tion in cases where judgment was given upon demurrer, confession, or default. By the
1400's the judges also had taken upon themselves the power to increase or decrease the
amount of the jury awards when the extent of the injury was within their cognizance.
In the 17th century the granting of new trials emerged where the jury had violated one
of the few rules of damages or where the court considered the amount awarded unreason-
able.
There is also evidence of minimal jury instructions in the earliest trials. In a pattern
similar to that of the court's power to set aside or alter a jury award, instructions to the
jury evolved from a mere suggestion to a binding charge. By the 19th century, the judge
was required to instruct the jury upon the measure of the award, and failure to do so or
misdirection were grounds for a new trial. This increased reliance on jury instructions
fostered the growth of the rules of damages. Id. at 25-28.
10 The standard of certainty emerged as a fundamental touchstone against which
proposed elements of the damage award were tested. The standard required that the
amount of plaintiff's loss be established by reference to factual data. Although the rule
was initially applied only in contract cases, particularly to claims for lost profits, it also
came to be relied upon in assessing tort damages. Id. at 99. Professor McCormick notes
that, to mitigate the standard's harshness, the courts have adopted several modifications,
including the following:
(a) If the fact of damage is proved with certainty, the extent or amount may
be left to reasonable inference.
(b) Where the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of proof of dam-
age, he cannot complain of the resulting uncertainty.
(c) Mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damage is not fatal.
(d) Mathematical precision in fixing the exact amount is not required.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
By fashioning a formula which enumerated the factors which
the jury might consider in arriving at a damage award, the judiciary
has sought to provide the plaintiff with a sum equivalent to the
stream of payments he would have earned but for his injury.
Guided by the concepts of truth and fairness, the courts - and at
times the legislatures"- - have dealt with suggested components
of the damage award on an ad hoc basis, purportedly accepting
those deemed consonant with reality and rejecting the rest. Para-
doxically, this development has created a formula for jury control
which ensures that the jury's award will not be the equivalent of
the plaintiff's expected stream of income. For example, the propo-
sition that a man's wage rate normally increases substantially over
his working life would seem realistic given the increasing produc-
tivity characteristic of today's economy. In addition to increments
reflecting economic growth, most workers can expect higher salaries
in future years resulting from personal advancements. While in-
dividual courts have made allowances for projected advances in
salary grade,'- the station in life which the claimant might have at-
tained,'3 and wage contracts which became effective after the claim-
ant's accident,' 4 most courts have refused to permit the considera-
tion of such relevant factors and have continued to compute future
lost earnings solely upon the basis of the wage rate received at the
date of injury or death.' 5
The failure of most courts to consider these elements is com-
pounded by their failure to include other important components
in the damage formula. Few courts have made any allowance for
(e) If the best evidence of the damage of which the situation admits is fur-
nished, this is sufficient. Id. at 101.
It can be seen from the cases reviewed infra, and particularly from the analysis of the
Sleeman decision, that these modifications are not uniformly applied by the courts. Had
the Sleeman court applied these modifications, it is arguable that it would have made an
allowance for inflation.
"1 For an example of legislative activity in this area, see id. at 235-36.
12 See LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
13See Aivaliotis v. S.S. Atlantic Glory, 214 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Va. 1963).
14 See Petition of Petroleum Tankers Corp., 204 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
15 For example, in McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 35 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), the court held that in cases of total disability or
death, the three elements for computing lost earning capacity are future normal earning
power, worklife expectancy, and the discount to present worth. (In cases of partial dis-
ability, the claimant's post-accident earning power is a fourth factor.) Yet, the court
proceeded to use the claimanes wages at the accident date as his future normal earning
power in the above formula. Similarly, in O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578,
582 (2d Cir. 1959), the court stated that earnings at the accident date are but one of
several factors used in computing future lost wages; yet, the final award for future lost
earnings was based solely upon the decedents take-home pay at the date of the accident.
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fringe benefits such as pension funds, stock option plans, hospitali-
zation, and medical benefits.16 Yet, it is no secret that such forms
of employment compensation are becoming an increasingly impor-
tant part of an employee's work agreement. 7 Similarly, in comput-
ing damages the courts have declined to consider the claimant's
attorney's fees, which currently absorb 25 to 50 percent of the
award. 18  With the emergence of the contingent fee concept, it is
likely that no factor has had as great an effect upon the damage
award as the payment of attorney's fees.
Perhaps the least realistic element in most damage award compu-
tations is the collateral source rule.' 9 The rule is based upon the
punitive proposition that payment of the plaintiff's expenses by a
disinterested third party (e.g., under insurance contracts, wage con-
tinuation plans, pension benefits, etc.) ought to benefit the plain-
tiff and not the wrongdoer.20  Accordingly, the courts have held
that a defendant remains liable for losses which the plaintiff would
have incurred but for his sources of collateral compensation. The
result has been to visit a windfall upon those plaintiffs fortunate
16 One of the first federal cases to include these factors in the damage award formula
was Petition of United States Steel Corp., Civil No. A-65-6 (N.D. Ohio May 7), appeal
docketed, Civil No. 19835-39 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 1969).
17 Expert testimony indicates that the fringe benefits currently received by an average
maritime worker equal about 27 percent of his basic wage. Id. Commissioners' Reports
and Opinions at 24. In United States Steel, the Commissioners included in the future
damage award an adjusted 20 percent factor as compensation for lost fringe benefits.
18 In New York, the court-prescribed maximum scales of contingent fees provide
either a sliding scale from 25 to 50 percent or a flat amount of 33 1/3 percent. See N.Y.
APP. Div. 1ST. DEPT., SPECIAL RULES REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS
AND COUNSELLORS AT LAw, R. 4. Long before the American Revolution, the rule be-
came established in England that the party who won a lawsuit could recover from his ad-
versary the costs of litigation, which included both court costs and attorney fees. This
indemnification of litigation expenses prevails in England today, but now lies within the
discretion of the court. It appears that the English system of costs was adopted in this
country before the Revolution, with each state subsequently prescribing by statute the
amount recoverable for attorney's fees. Although these amounts may have been adequate
at the time, none of the statutes have been revised to provide for devaluation of the dollar.
In federal courts the $20 docket fee is awarded to the prevailing party for his attorney's
fee, in Pennsylvania $3, in New Hampshire $1. Most statutes enacted more recently make
no provision for attorney's fees, further establishing the tradition that such costs are not
recoverable in this country. C. McCORMIcK, supra note 6, at 234-36.
19 See Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INS. L.J. 545,
547.
2 0 See Clark v. Berry Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262, 271, 280 N.W. 505, 510 (1938)
(medical expenses to be paid by the plaintiff's employer were included in the damage
award); Clough v. Schwartz, 94 N.H. 138, 141, 48 A.2d 921, 923 (1946) (plaintiff's
medical bills paid by a firemen's relief association were not discounted from the award).
See also Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1930);
Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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enough to have procured appropriate insurance, employment bene-
fits, or access to certain gratuities.
21
The foregoing review illustrates the inroads which the judiciary
has made into the jury's originally unlimited power to Assess dam-
ages. It also demonstrates that for the most part, the courts have
not accorded a position of primacy to the reality of the disabled
plaintiff's loss. Further, they have justified their rulings on the
several factors offered as formula components with conclusory lan-
guage which does not disclose a pattern of logical consistency:22
What is worse, there has been no uniform application of the "prin-
ciples" enunciated by the courts. A prime example of the latter is
the inconsistent treatment accorded the amount of a claimant's future
21 The rule has been applied even where a defendant employer paid a portion of the
plaintiffs insurance premium. For example, in Petition of United States Steel Corp.,
Civil No. A-65-6 (N.D. Ohio May 7), appeal docketed, Civil No. 19835-39 (6th Cir.
Sept. 8, 1969), no downward adjustments were made for social security benefits or life
insurance payments received by the decedents' families, the commissioners noting that
although the defendant employer paid one-half of the social security tax, such payment
was actually made in lieu of higher wages which the employee might otherwise have re-
ceived directly. Id. Commissioners' Awards and Opinions at 9. This treatment is con-
sistent with the holding in New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Leary, 204 F.2d 461, 468 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953), that the Railroad Retirement Act serves as
social security for common carrier employees, the benefits of which are not directly at-
tributable to the negligent employer and, therefore, not deductible from the' employee's
damage award. The doctrine has been relaxed only in cases where the defendant bore
the entire cost of a benefit received by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Moore-McCormick Lines,
Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962),
which deducted the proceeds of a liability insurance policy, premiums for which were
paid solely by the defendant-employer; O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 585
(2d Cir. 1959), where the court held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act the trial
court was to ascertain whether the defendant had borne the cost of flight risk insurance
- if it had, the proceeds of the insurance might be deducted from the award; Lawson v.
United States, 192 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951), where the discounted proceeds of War Risk
Insurance, the cost of which was paid by the defendant, were deducted from the damages
awarded to the deserted wife of a deceased seaman. The cure for the inequities caused
by the rule may lie outside the courts. With increasing frequency, insurance policies
provide for subrogation of the insured's interest, thereby eliminating double recoveries.
Currently auto insurance companies are attempting to eliminate double recovery of medi-
cal expenses arising from accidents. Newer policies provide that the company will have
subrogated rights against the negligent driver to recover payments it has made for the
victim's medical expenses. This is patterned after the subrogation of property damage
rights, which has for some time been standard in auto insurance policies. Peckinpaugh,
.rupra note 19, at 546-47.
2 2 The court in McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), was bound by "[w]hatever the reasons of history or
policy for the American practice of generally not awarding attorneys' fees to the success-
ful party" might happen to be. In defending the collateral source rule, American courts
abandon the rule of certainty and exact compensation in favor of the view that the
wrongdoer should not benefit from the victim's collateral assistance. See cases cited
note 20 supra. The McWeeney court's refusal to reverse a deduction of income taxes
from the plaintiff's $4,800 yearly salary was justified, in part, by the fact that attorney's
fees and inflation were not accounted for in the award and the belief that the jury would
be confused by an additional calculation. 282 F.2d at 37-38.
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earnings which would have been paid in income taxes.3  In Mc-
Weeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,24 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that it was not reversible error for the trial
court to fail to discount an amount for taxes from the claimant's
$4,800 salary. The court based its decision on the lack of a predict-
able future tax rate for the 39-year-old bachelor plaintiff, and on
the confusion which this additional computation would bring to
the formula. Noting that its refusal to deduct taxes would partially
compensate for the fact that no allowance was made for either con-
tingent fees or the effects of inflation, the court conceded that the
failure to deduct an amount for taxes might lead to excessive awards,
but reasoned that such cases would arise only where higher salaries
were involved (e.g., $100,000, where the tax rate would be over 50
percent).,5 Five years later, in LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World
Airlines,26 the same court held that a district court had properly ex-
ercised its discretion in deducting a 15 percent tax factor from a
wrongful death award, where the decedent's average future annual
earnings were $16,000 (with 38 years of future loss of earnings
totalling nearly $600,000). In LeRoy, the court viewed the tax
element as "one of the smaller uncertainties involved in the com-
putations. '2 7  It has been argued that the uncertainty of future
taxes, which Mclfeeney relied on, is eliminated in wrongful death
actions, such as LeRoy;28 however, the fact that the claimant is dead
does not appear to augment the trial court's ability to predict the
decedent's potential tax liabilities. Thus, as McWeeney and LeRoy
illustrate, even where the courts have sought to apply reasoned
principles in considering elements of the damage award formula,
23 Because damage are excluded from gross income by Internal Revenue Code of
1954 § 104 (a) (2), overcompensation results when the award does not reflect tax lia-
bility.
24 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
25 Id. at 38. A critique of the McIreeney decision suggests: "To allow the size of
the plaintiff's income to be the controlling factor would discriminate between plaintiffs
on a basis having no relation to the amount of damages suffered and would not reduce
the conjecturality as to future tax liability." 14 VAND. L. REv. 639, 642 (1961). This
description arguably applies to the other components of future damages presently being
considered.
26 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
27 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
2 8 See also Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 628-32 (D.S.C. 1967) (taxes
should be deducted in a wrongful death action where the decedent's salary is $10,746 at
the time of his death). The courts are presently undecided on the question of discount-
ing for taxes, with one case, Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1014 (D.
Hawaii 1965), suggesting that such a deduction represents the more modern and reason-
able rule. For a list of federal cases supporting or rejecting the deduction for income
taxes, see Brooks v. United States, supra at 631 n.17.
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the standards have proved unreliable and the results have been in-
consistent.
A final element of the future loss of wages formula - an ele-
ment crucial to evaluating the Sleeman court's disallowance of an
adjustment for inflation - is the requirement of discount to present
worth. 9 In a 1916 case, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly,30 the
United States Supreme Court departed from the disjointed applica-
tion of judicial "principles" discussed above and held that because
"it is self-evident that a sum of money in hand is worth more than
a like sum payable in the future,"' the award must be discounted to
present worth. However, the Court prescribed no fixed rule to in-
sure that the award plus interest would evenly match the future loss.
Rather, it suggested that the discount factor should reflect the then
current earning power of money which might change over the
years. 32  Consistent with Kelly's refusal to prescribe an absolute dis-
count factor, federal courts have adopted no single factor in dis-
counting present worth, relying instead upon juror discretion."3
Indeed, the discount principle is "self-evident"; the notion that
a stream of payments over time is not today "worth" an amount
equal to their sum forms the basis for all debt transactions. Because
this has been true since the barter system gave way to money eco-
nomies, it is somewhat startling that until 1916 the principle was
not applied to damage awards. Yet perhaps this delay really is not
'9 Another factor which merits passing mention and which is unique to wrongful
death actions is that after the inclusion or exclusion of discount for income tax has been
determined, the award must be discounted by the amount which would have been spent
for living expenses by the decedent. The federal and state courts have adopted no specific
guide for this apportionment, allowing as much as 83 1/3 percent of the award to be re-
ceived by a wife with five minor children, and 50 percent by the wife alone. Petition
of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15, 27 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
modified, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966). See Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.,
333 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1964), af'g 221 F. Supp. 243, 246 (D. Va. 1963); O'Connor
v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1959); Brooks v. United States, 273 F.
Supp. 619, 633 (D.S.C. 1967); Petition of Petroleum Tankers Corp., 204 F. Supp. 727,
734 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
30 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
31 Id. at 489.
3 2 Kelly suggests only that the discount factor should not be the highest legal interest
rate available, thus requiring the plaintiff to exercise investment skills in order to recoup
the differential. Id. at 490-91.
33 The Second Circuit has said that the discount factor must be no less than 4 per-
cent, but it established no basis for this requirement Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator
Corp., 271 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1959). The Sixth Circuit, which remanded Sleeman
to the trial court for reduction of the award to present worth, has said that a jury receiv-
ing an instruction to award the "money value which will fully, fairly, and justly com-
pensate the plaintiff for all such loss ... he has suffered or will suffer" will properly
discount to present worth without further guides. Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288
F.2d 262, 265 (6th Cir. 1961).
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so surprising when one considers that equally "self-evident" -con-
cepts - the inclusion of pay raises, fringe benefits, and an allow-
ance for contingent fees - still have not been applied to those
awards.
It was amidst this atmosphere of judicially constrained juror dis-
cretion that the Sleeman court was confronted with adjudging the
merits of an allowance for inflation. Reasoning that such an allow-
ance was "speculative and debatable" in nature and that it would
negate the required discount to present worth, the court held that
the allowance should not be considered as a component of the dam-
age award formula. In light of the nation's economic history since
the 1930's, the court conceded that the use of present wages as a
standard for future earnings loss was somewhat unfair to the plain-
tiff; however, it feared that an allowance for inflation would open
the door to similarly unpredictable upward adjustments. 34
In view of the fact that the collateral source rule, and the judi-
cial failure to consider real income increments, fringe benefits, and
contingent fees have all served to divorce damage awards from ac-
tual losses, 35 it is paradoxical that the Sleeman court would base its
decision upon a standard of certainty for assuring that damage
awards approximate actual losses. Yet even if one acknowledges
the validity of the court's approach, it is arguable that the increas-
ing rate of inflation, which has been relatively steady over the past
30 years, appears to be more predictable than the income tax dis-
counts allowed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Moreover, the court's apparent belief that the inflation allowance
would induce trial courts to incorporate into the award the most
tangential components of future damages represents, at best, a make-
weight argument often used whenever a hasty and conclusory ra-
tionale is needed to dismiss an unsettling suggestion."6 However,
even if the merits of this reasoning were conceded, the nature and
duration of inflationary trends can be established by expert testi-
34 414 F.2d at 308.
35 The irony of this result is apparent when one contrasts the scrutiny with which
the courts today apply the rules of evidence and procedure, and the laws of liability,
with the inevitable divorce of the final award from the actual loss owing to reliance upon
unrealistic rules of damages.
36 See, e.g., Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), where, in a case of
first impression, Lord Abinger, C.B., without considering the relevance of the cause of ac-
tion to the then infant industrial age, denied recovery to a servant injured while riding in
his master's defective van. Lord Abinger rationalized this result by noting that to allow
recovery would open the floodgates to a sea of litigation.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
mony and objective presentation of statistical data. 7  When compe-
tent testimony can establish that inflation and other factors will
operate to create a disparity between plaintiff's actual loss and his
damage award, equity would seem to require that they be given due
consideration in the damage award formula. 8
Declining to include the allowance for inflation in the formula,
the Sleeman court remanded to the trial court for a reduction of
the award to its present worth, as required by Kelly. 9 However,
in its blind adherence to the Kelly discount requirement the court
offended the spirit of the Kelly Court's reasoning. In Kelly, the
Court reasoned that the reduction to present worth was necessary to
make the award plus interest commensurate with the actual loss.
This discount factor was to be based on the current earning power
of money at the time of each trial, not on an inflexible rule.4"
While the interest available through investment of the award is no
less significant today than in 1916, the theory upon which the
Kelly Court premised its inclusion in the damage formula suggests
37 Galbraith suggests that notwithstanding attempts to control rising prices, infla-
tion will persist at a "suppressed" rate because of the wage-price spiral. J. GALBRATH,
A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL 63-65 (1952). See Leonard, Future Economic Value
in Wrongful Death Litigation, 30 OHIo ST. I.J. 502, 507-08 (1969). Professor Leon-
ard predicts that salaries will continue to rise in the years ahead, reflecting increased
productivity and continuing inflation. The reality of inflation has also been judicially
acknowledged. In McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), Judge Friendly observed that "there are few who
do not regard some degree of continuing inflation as here to stay and would be willing
to translate their own earning power into a fixed annuity." Harper and James note that
Judge Friendly's observations reflect the prevailing mood in the nation today. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.11, Comment at 146 nn.8-9 (Supp.
1968). See also Normand v. Thomas Theatre Corp., 349 Mich. 50, 84 N.W.2d 451
(1957), wherein the court took judicial notice of the effects of inflation in comparing
the verdict with awards in prior years for similar injuries; Talbert v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 321 Mo. 1080, 15 S.W.2d 762 (1929), where, in a trial 13 years after the accident,
the court noted that $5,000 in 1914 would have been worth more to the estate than was
$10,000 in 1927. For a review of the problems which inflation presents in damage
awards, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra at 1323-26 (1956), and at 145-46 (Supp.
1968).
38 An additional argument against forcing plaintiffs to bear the cost of such factors
is the belief by some that plaintiffs are generally undercompensated. The court in Gray-
son v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958), said: "We think we may judicially
note that notwithstanding that the law contemplates full compensation, incidental losses
and handicaps are suffered in a great number of personal injury cases which are not, and
cannot be, fully compensated." See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 37, at 1303-04,
reporting a survey which reveals that severely injured railroad workers generally have
not received suitable compensation for lost wages. For a further discussion of the in-
adequacies of the present system, see Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
39414 F.2d at 308.
40See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
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that the same Court sitting today would also recognize inflation as a
separate element of compensation.
The most important aspect of Sleeman is not the narrow holding
of the case, but rather its exemplification of the bizarre melange
that is the American damage award system. Even if Sleeman had
approved the inflation allowance, the decision would probably have
attracted few followers among the other circuits. The entire system
is oriented to the belief that, without close control by the courts,
juries are incapable of accurately assessing a claimant's loss.41 The
result, however, has been to divorce the computation of damage
awards from economic reality. When simple arithmetic indicates
that judicial rules do not reflect actual losses, concern for a fair and
accurate system of damage award compensation demands a reevalu-
ation.
A more effective approach to damages should begin with a re-
consideration of the jury's capacity to assess variables. One com-
mentator, noting that juries are required to deal with uncertainties
of liability whenever the versions of the plaintiff and defendant are
inconsistent, has made the following observation:
It is only as to the fixing of damages that the rigorous requirement
that the fact of loss must be proved with "certainty" comes to be laid
down, though probably the jury is no less competent to make a rea-
sonable guess as to whether a profit would have been made under
given circumstances than to guess whether one witness is lying or
another.42
Jurors are assumed to be capable of grasping complexities outside
the area of damages; should they not be even more able to deal with
factors as common to their personal experience as wages, consumer
prices, fringe benefits, and the like?
With the increased complexity of today's economy has come an
increased understanding of the forces at work in the economy.
Through the use of expert testimony, this knowledge is readily avail-
able to those charged with the task of assessing future damages.
Professor Leonard, who has testified in more than 30 such cases,
urges that reliance on such expertise is the only way in which the
reality of future loss can be equitably ascertained.43 Moreover, the
need for greater flexibility in assessing the real factors of future
losses is apparent. Until more discretion is revested in the trier of
41 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 24.
421d. at 105.
43 Leonard, supra note 37, at 503.
